National Repository of Grey Literature 2 records found  Search took 0.00 seconds. 
Informační sítě na trhu práce a teorie her
Benešová, Anita ; Dlouhý, Martin (advisor) ; Zouhar, Jan (referee)
The use of personal contacts and the role of education as a signal of the Worker's productivity are two important aspects of the job search process. The aim of this thesis is to develop a model that combines both approaches. We distinguish between random and strategic models of job information networks. In the former case the structure of the network is given, while in the latter it depends on the strategic decision of the Workers. We present a strategic model of network formation with two types of Workers who are able to signal their productivity by the level of their education. When applying for a job they have two possibilities of contacting the Employer: a direct application and an indirect application through a friend who currently works for the Employer.
Signaling games and their applications
Uhlířová, Jarmila ; Dlouhý, Martin (advisor) ; Zouhar, Jan (referee)
Signaling games are part of games with imperfect information. The games with imperfect information mean that the player doesn't know all moves of players, which played before him. The signaling game as such are interesting because some players have more information than the others. The better informed group of players can indicate to uninformed players what they know and wait how the opponents react. Generally the move which uninformed party takes influence all players. In my papers I want to describe main rules for signaling games, show possible ways how to solve this kinds of problems and use this new knowledge in aplication on problem which can be usable in practices.

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